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Abstract
This paper examines the role that computer-based information systems can play in the
communication and sharing of knowledge. It considers the actual and potential symbiosis of such
systems with the concepts of knowledge management within an organizational environment. It
identifies the objectivist philosophy of knowledge, which typically underpins the literature
advocating computer-based knowledge management, and questions the foundational assumptions of
this perspective in terms of the dichotomy made between tacit and explicit forms of knowledge. Thus
it is suggested that there is a lack of critical understanding within the paradigms of research which
examine the role of computer usage in managerial knowledge development, and that this is based
upon a prevailing objectivist orientation to systems design. A subjectivist philosophy of knowledge
is introduced which identifies the tacit and explicit elements of all human knowledge that are
embodied in both human minds and bodies and embedded in organizational actions, activities and
environments. The paper develops a critique of the possibility of computer-based information
systems and their contribution to the process of communication of knowledge. This is based not only
systems developers’ failure to understand key social and cultural issues but also on a failure to
recognise the fundamental character of what human knowledge consists of. Finally, the possibilities
for the true extension of the role of computer-based information systems within human knowledge
communication and sharing activities are explored.
Keywords: tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge, computer-based information systems
1. Introduction
Much recent literature in the area of knowledge management (KM) suggests that the new data
infrastructure will permit radically new business process activities and allow organizational
membership to create new value-added, information-based products and services (Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995; Castells, 1996; Ferneley et al, 2004). A resonant theme in this literature on
knowledge management is the central role of computer-based information systems (CBIS). The
aim of this technology is to provide a powerful means of gaining new insight into, and control
over, business functions and to assist directly in knowledge sharing activities in all
organizational areas. The ultimate goal is the integration of information processing in order to
create a knowledge environment in which organizational members can regard and understand the
organization in new ways. Much of the discourse in this area provides an optimistic approach to
describing how the knowledge assets of an organization may be shared, or strongly supported,
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through the intensive deployment of computer-based information systems. However, it is argued
in this paper that this approach to knowledge management is largely based upon a restrictive
objectivist epistemological perspective.
2. Knowledge Management and the Objectivist Perspective
The objectivists perspective identifies the existence of a set of objective and reliable facts,
principles and theories which are available codification and sharing in a tangible form, for
example scientific theories published in documentation. The assumption is that it is possible to
develop a type of knowledge and understanding that is free from individual subjectivity. This
normative perspective is characterized as one which focusses upon `the discovery of technology
solutions (rules, explanations, memory systems) to knowledge problems’ (Shultze and Leidner,
2002: p.221) However in developments in KM literature authors who support the objectivist
recognise that knowledge may be categorized into two categories: those of explicit and those of
tacit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; von Krogh, 2000; Stenmark, 2001). This
functional emphasis is characterized by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) who state that tacit
knowledge may be convertable into explicit knowledge through computer-based systems. While
explicit knowledge is identified as that which may be codified, tacit knowledge is identifed as
that which people possess but which remains inexpressible and incorporates both cognitive
activity and physical skills (Nonaka and Taketichi, 1995). However, the ambiguity of tacit
knowledge is considered to open the possibility of contesting just what it is that makes up its
`tacitness’ and opens up the possibility for systems’ designer led attempts to identify explicit
elements which may be available for incorporation into KM systems. Nonaka and Taketichi
(1995) posit that through `capturing’ knowledge in this way, it can be replicated and shared.
Through the incorporation of inserting human agency into the technology, these authors identify
the possibility to convert tacit knowledge into a more tangible commodity and consequently
enable the active sharing of this knowledge. Thus, while tacit knowledge is regarded as
subjective, being embedded within the particular cultural values and perspectives of those who
interpret it and use it, it is suggested that it always contains within it the possiblity of conversion
to explicit knowledge, which is unhindered by such restrictions and may be regarded as a pure
and objective form. The notion of tacit knowledge now becomes one of it being knowledge-notyet-articulated, but awaiting for its `translation’ or `conversion’ into explicit knowledge
(Tsoukas, 2003). The recent developments in CBIS for knowledge sharing are now being
promoted as part of a paradigmatic break with the more traditional forms of management
information systems which allows for the conversion of this tacit knowledge to explicit forms
(Hayes, 2001; von Krogh et al, 2001; Lee and Choi, 2003). However, it is argued here that much
of this development, often promoted by academics and vendors as tools for knowledge sharing
amongst the organizational membership, may on detailed examination merely reflect the
continued extension of the rationalistic objectivist philosophy with its tradition traceable to
Weber's (1922/68) concepts of bureaucratization. This is, in part, probably a reflection of the
roots of systems design in the automation of `well understood' business activities. Well-defined
processes and a well-defined problem space are at least implicitly assumed by the objectivist
perspective. Typically, computer-based applications of KM follow the work of Simon (1960) and
presume a heuristic search through a problem or possibility space undertaken by a socially
isolated individual. Newell and Simon (1972) further objectify knowledge and qualitative
reasoning by claiming that computational manipulation of symbolic representations is
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representative of human thought, understanding and choice. This suggests a `conduit’ model of
`knowledge’ in the form of expert human judgement and qualitative reasoning that can be
transferred from the human `expert' and implemented onto a computer and transferred to a
recipient without distortion. As Shultze and Leidner (2002: p.221) observe, `the metaphor that
emerges from these operationalizations is knowledge as an object that can exist outside an
individual, that can be stored and manipulated in the absence of a human knower, and can be
transferred to others (human or machine)’. Thus from the 'knowledge management as
technology' perspective a strong role for CBIS in supporting the sharing of explicit knowledge is
advocated (Nonaka & Taketichi, 1995). The division between tacit and explicit forms of
knowledge within the objectivist epistemology has important consequences for explaining the
ways in which tacit and explicit knowledge may be communicated within the organization.
3. Knowledge Management and the Subjectivist Perspective
The objectivist epistemology of knowledge is one which identifies the distinctive separation
between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge forms. This is in contrast with the subjectivisit
perspective which suggests that tacit and explicit forms of knowledge are indivisible and are
mutually constituted (Tsoukas, 2003). Thus the notion of rigidly explicit objectivist knowledge
forms within KM may be identified as self-contradictory in that it contains 'tensions and
contradictions in the idea per se' (Alvesson and Karrernan 2001: p.996). As Polanyi (1967) notes,
without their tacit coefficients, all forms of data [words, formulae, maps, graphs, etc] are strictly
meaningless. Without the background understanding of grammar and syntax any text or language
will appear as a random presentation of letters, numbers and images. Following from the need
for this background knowledge Polanyi (1967) argues that fully explicit knowledge cannot exist
as all knowledge is either tacit, or rooted in tacit knowledge.
Two distinct but closely inter-related elements of the subjectivist perspective on knowledge are
that knowledge does not exist outside of the knowing subject and, secondly, that knowledge is
located within and is identifiable with the activities and practices that people undertake. Thus the
indivisibility of tacit and explicit knowledge within the epistemology of the subjectivist perspective means that the unarticulated and uncodified elements of any knowledge will always
make it tacit to a certain degree. The subjectivist perspective challenges the objectivist position
that knowledge can exist in a fully explicit and codified form independently of human agents
(Wilson, 1997; Tsoukas, 2003). The subjectivist perspective suggests that knowledge and
understanding emerges from the activies of people acting within the specific circumstances and
environments they find themselves. In what Tsoukas (1996) identifies as the 'indeterminacy of
practice' the explicit and well defined rules which may guide action will always contain some
element of ambiguity or uncertainty, which requires actors to make inferences and judgements.
From the subjectivist perspective knowing becomes a function of the integration of both
cognitive and physical processes which involves active individuals bringing their
embodied/embedded knowledge to act on focal object (Wilson, 1997; Ferneley et al, 2004). That
the objectivist perspective recognises the role of human agency in the development and use of
knowledge is evidenced in the data-information-knowledge process model. Here it is suggested
that knowledge is emergent when data and/or information is acted upon by human
intellect/labour added (Wilson, 1997, Tsoukas, 2003). However, the objectivist perspective
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assumes that the output of this interaction can be codified into fully explicit knowledge, whereas
the subjectivist perspective does not.
Related to the concept of the embodied nature of knowledge is the understanding of the difficulty
of separating knowledge from activity. This challenges the idea of what knowing is and
consequently and development of what knowledge is. The objectivist perspective conceptualizes
knowing to be primarily a cognitive process carried out by the reflective individual in isolation
from the physical [mind-body duality] (Barnes, 1977; Damasio, 1994). In contrast, the
subjectivist perspective posits that knowing and doing may not be so easily separated. The
subjectivist perspective challenges the cognitive model of understanding and views the
development of knowledge as resulting from the routine activities of people and, as such, is less
of a cognitive process and more of a holistic activity. This sense of knowing is identified by
Polanyi (1967) who observed that we know with all our senses, muscles and sinews and well as
our brains. From this perspective knowledgeable activity is the result of an intimate fusion of
both an actors thought and action whilst engaged in specific activities and tasks. In contrast to
the objectivist perspective on knowledge, where it is proposed that codified knowledge can exist
in an isolated and reified form, the subjectivist perspective argues that all knowledge is socially
constructed and remains highly subjective (Wilson, 1997; Tsoukas 2003). While the objectivist
perspective assumes that language contains fixed and objective meanings and that there exists a
direct equivalence between words and what they reference, the subjectivist perspective argues
that the meaning of language is inherently ambiguous and suggests that language has no such
fixed meanings (Wilson, 1997; Tsoukas, 2003). Thus the subjectivity or interpretive flexibility of
language undermines objectivist claims upon status of knowledge, whether it is totally tacit and
personal or whether it is partially explicit and codified into a text.
4. Knowledge, Compter-Based Information Systems and the Communication of

Meaning

The proposition that all knowledge remains subjective has significant implications for the extent
to which any knowledge, no matter how explicit, may be shared using CBIS. If all knowledge
has tacit components and tacit knowledge is difficult to codify and communicate then this
suggests that the sharing of explicit knowledge may not be as easy the objectivist perspective of
KM suggests. As observed by McAdam and McCreedy (2000) both the creation of semi-explicit
knowledge in the form of a text, together with the reading and interpretation involved in an
actual understanding of it, require an active process of both meaning construction and inference.
A further difficulty for the promoters of KM is that knowledge can never be totally neutral and
unbiased and will remain in varying degrees inseparable from the values of those who produced
it (Brown and Duguid, 1998). Further, this process of constructing meaning and inferring from it
is typically culturally embedded. The meanings that people attach to language and events tend to
be shaped by and, to some extent, reflect the values and assumptions of the sociocultural milieu
in which they exist (Cole, 2003). An example of the way in which pre-existing values and
assumptions influence these processes of knowledge construction and interpretation is through
the filtering of data/information in order to decide its relevancy. Examples of such filtering
processes at both the organizational and individual level are those which contributed to the
Challenger and Columbia Space Shuttle accidents (Cole, 2003). In the case of the Challenger
engineers neglected what turned out to be important information regarding O-ring erosion as,
based on the assumptions they had, such a situation presented an extremely small risk. In the
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case of the Columbia cladding from the main fuel tank was identified as hitting the port wing of
the space shuttle. However reliance on damage prediction software for this scenario resulted in
engineers assessing the event as insignificant to safety and failed to insist on any visual
inspection of the damage which could have been undertaken by the crew (Cole, 2003).
The importance of the way in which certain types of knowledge become culturally embedded
within areas of professional activity is identified by Lave and Wenger (1991). They identify this
process as one of the development of 'communities of practice' where working and the sharing of
knowledge are social-communal activities which contain many informal aspects (Barnes, 1977;
Brown and Duguid, 1998). A particular occupational group [community of practice] typically
develops their own ways of working and their own values and assumptions, which shapes
activity and influences the ways which knowledge is developed and interpreted (Brown and
Duguid, 1998). The example of the Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters showed how the
values and assumptions of such professional communities, all of whom were intensively
involved with IT based `knowledge’ systems, shape and distort the way meaning and knowledge
is developed in these systems.
The problem of computer supported KM implementations distorting professional knowledge is
highlighted in Ferneley et al (2004). In their study of a KM supported call centre, established to
facilitate medical nursing consultation, they concluded that the KM systems were an effort to
rationalize the network of personal interactions that constitutes the supposedly informal
relationships and tacit skill elements of nursing professionals. The case study revealed the
problem of distortion of meaning and ultimately action remained within the KM implementation
where the nurses continuing professional practices and mores failed to confirm and reinforce the
authority of systems based technology. Ferneley et al (2004) observe that the nurse operatives’
actions in `short-circuiting’ the KM system and deviating from script-based responses in pursuit
what they believed to be the patients best interest was, perhaps, an example of how the system
has become a site of a struggle for interpretative supremacy about what nursing (professional
knowledge) is and how it should be deployed. The dangers inherent in over-reliance upon
computer-based systems by both medically qualified staff or the incorrect use of it by unqualified
staff was in this case overridden by the continued deployment of professional skills by nurse
operatives. The difficulty remained in the dichotomy between the system designers and its users
with regard to the degree with which this knowledge autonomy should be continued to be
allowed to override the essential structures of the system design. Such contestation has
significant implications for both professional self-representation and resistance to erosion of this
through systemic reductionism (Ferneley et al, 2004). Thus from perspective of the subjectivist
position `knowledge’ remains identified as being highly contestable in both its nature and
meaning. The meaning of any particular piece of partially explicit knowledge rests upon its
social construction both by its producer and user together with the degree to which it is
professionally and culturally embedded.
5. Knowledge and Human Communicative Practices
The proponents of KM identify the possiblity of designing CBIS for allowing people to reflect
on the interpretations of events that they have made (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Hayes, 2001;
Stenmark, 2001). Unlike more traditional management information systems that automated
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formal, hierarchical data flows, such network technologies allow for the possibility of horizontal
communication between much broader organizational constituencies (Hayes, 2001). From this
perspective CBIS may be used to support distributed cognition by enabling individuals to make
richer representations of their understanding of situations and events and to reflect upon these,
together with engaging in dialogue with others, before using these representations to inform
action. Thus under this KM position it is recognised that tacit knowledge exists as an important
feature of organizational life but it is posited that through the use of networked computer-based
communication etc this will somehow `solidify’ into organizationally useful forms. However the
degree to which people may be able to achieve the necessary self–reflexivity, particularly within
the organizational setting, remains questionable. For example, there may be values and
assumptions that are1 buried deep in our subconscious that we are not aware of and cannot even
begin to articulate. Further, even if people can reflect on their assumptions and values, they may
not be able to articulate them fully or clearly. As Dawson (2000: p 321) observes, 'these
processes have major deficiencies, partly as people can know far more than they can
communicate to others'. The extent to which anyone, however willing, diligent and reflexive they
are, is capable of developing an explicit appreciation of the values upon which their actions and
opinions are based, is always somewhat partial. The rational methods that are so employed to
solve the problems of translating embedded knowledge into that which can be articulated and
made explicit are developed in a systems framework which presupposes the bureaucratic-rational
models of what is acceptable as knowledge. This is not surprising, since only in these rigid
contexts can `knowledge' be unambiguously defined. Beyond these contexts is an intellectual
barrier which cannot be breached without abandoning the notion that true knowledge has at is
basis both tacit and the subconscious elements which will forever remain unavailable to formal
systems (Winograd and Flores, 1986). Thus, the problem of articulating and sharing knowledge
is not just that it is tacit, but that it may be partly subconscious and forever unobtainable.
Another difficulty that many of the proponents of this approach to tacit knowledge sharing is
that, for such implementions to work, an idealized model of both human behaviour in
organizations and the nature of organizational relations must be presupposed (Schultze and
Boland, 2000; Stenmark, 2001). They assume the enhancement of the communicative
competence of the organizational participants through the creation of an `ideal speech situation'
(Habermas, 1970), where genuine debate and willingness to share with others their assumptions
and values leads to undistorted communication and a move towards a truly rational consensus
about the constitution of organizational. However, as Scarbrough (1999) suggests, the ability to
achieve open communication and the sharing of knowledge in many organizations may prove
elusive. While some organizations have been successful in institutionalizing systems that review
and challenge basic norms, policies, and operating procedures in relation to changes occurring in
their environment, e.g. by encouraging ongoing debate and innovation, many fail to do so. This
failure is especially true of bureaucratic organizations, since their fundamental organizing principles
often operate in a way that actually obstructs the knowledge generation process. This is
compounded by the complexity of the link between an organization and its use of technology.
Because of the increasing scope of technological requirements, as well as their extensive influence
over organizational activity, the costs of large-scale technologies `create immense demands that
dramatically narrow the room for democratic decision-making' (Strasser, 1984: p.162). This may be
particularly so in managerial settings where key participants’ assumptions and values may be
perceived by management to be unwanted or unacceptable [c.f. the space shuttle disasters]. The
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promotors of knowledge sharing present a limited analysis of the potentially conflicting nature of
organizational relations and largely assume that organizational member are open and
forthcoming about their motivations for sharing knowledge and that there is little conflict of
interest in doing so. Storey and Barnett (2000) and Hayes and Walsham (2000) illustrate the
limitations of such a perspective by observing the extent to which knowledge-sharing processes
can be highly political in nature. As Polanyi (1967) observes there is no such thing as fully
explicit knowledge and the tacit-explicit dichotomy must be considered to be misguided. Instead,
all knowledge must be seen to consist of both tacit and explicit components and any partially
explicit knowledge is relatively meaningless without an understanding and awareness of its tacit
components (Polanyi, 1967; Tsoukas, 2003). Thus, although it may be argued that it is possible
to use CBIS for the transferrence of semi-explicit knowledge, without the tacit understandings
which support it, it will remain difficult to develop a complete understanding of the true meaning
of this knowledge. Without a broad appreciation of the tacit assumptions individuals make in the
way they use language it will not be possible to develop a full understanding of it. As a
consequence, if it is recognised that all knowledge contains within it tacit components, then it
leads to the conclusion that the extent to which it may be possible to communicate and share true
human knowledge through CBIS will necessarily be limited and constrained. The sharing and
transference of knowledge transcends the conduit metaphor and the process becomes one of
active human participants involved in the inferrence and construction of meaning as a result of
differing experiences. In support of this the subjectivist perspective proposes that the sharing of
knowledge requires individuals to develop an awareness of the tacit assumptions and values
upon which all knowledge is based. Bolisani and Scarso (2000) identify this as the 'language
game' approach to knowledge sharing and emphasise the importance of dialogue and language to
such processes. From this perspective knowledge sharing within organizations requires
developing a process of mutual perspective taking where `distinctive individual knowledge is
evaluated, integrated and exchanged with that of others in the organization’ (Boland and
Tenkasi, 1995: p358). The problem remains that in order to achieve this KM designers have to
resist the temptation to try to operationalise tacit knowledge rather than taking the more difficult
path of finding `new ways of talking, fresh forms of interacting, and novel ways of
distinguishing and connecting’ (Tsoukas, 2003, p16)
6. The Role of Computer-Based Information Systems in Knowledge Sharing
Whilst the subjectivist and objectivist perspectives on knowledge have differing implications for
the role of computer-based information systems in knowledge-sharing processes, making general
conclusions remains problematical. This is a result of the wide ranging contexts in which
knowledge sharing may take place. Apart from the differing levels of tacit knowledge the
knowledge to be shared may contain, other important factors in the communication process need
consideration. For example, it may take place in a small organizaton where the membership
know each other well and interact on a social level, or in a large one where many the members
have never met face-to-face and share differing social and cultural backgrounds, a feature to
increasingly found in globalised corporations. In all these situations the role of CBIS is likely to
vary considerably. In the development of some conclusions about the role of CBIS in knowledge
mangement this section examines some of the key factors which affect the process of knowledge
sharing and briefly discusses how they may affect the role of CBIS in this activity.
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The single most important factor influencing the KM processes is the degree of tacitness
perceived to be in the knowledge domain. Studies of various organizational contexts and casestudies have shown that, where knowledge is perceived to be highly tacit, the effective sharing of
it requires intensive social interaction (MacKenzie, 1996; Wilson, 1999; Robinson and Wilson,
2003; Ferneley et al, 2004). Thus, CBIS are likely to be most useful in situations where
knowledge is perceived to have a significant explicit element. However, as previously discussed,
the subjectivist perspective suggests that fully explicit knowledge can never exist. Therefore,
even where knowledge is partly explicit, KM will be at its most effective where CBIS knowledge
sharing exists along side other communication and sharing mechanisms. Another key factor is
the extent to which of referential knowledge exists between the parties involved in the
knowledge sharing facilitation.
Considerable resarch supports the view that the sharing of knowledge between people who have
only a restricted set referential knowledge between will be difficult, whether this is done through
CBIS or through face-to-face interaction (Brown and Duguid, 1998; Bolisani and Scarso, 2000).
CBIS are substantially disadvantaged in this aspect since the medium provides a much reduced
'richness' of communication than would be available through face-to-face interaction (Brown and
Duguid, 1998). One of the postulated advantages of the `communities of practice’ model of
knowledge sharing is that participants in such a community develop a significant set of
referential knowledge (tacit assumptions, shared values, social norms etc.) through working
intensively with each other, which makes the practice of knowledge sharing within such a
community relatively straightforward (Brown and Duguid, 1998). Thus, CBIS are suggested to
have the greatest potential role where there is already in existence a significant amount of
common knowledge shared between the parties involved in KM process, such as will exist
within a community of practice. The contemporary KM literature indicates that, for KM to be
effective, people have to demonstrate a willingness to share their knowledge and that a critical
factor in shaping this willingness is the extent to which trust previously exists between relevant
parties (Hayes and Walsham, 2000; Storey and Quintas, 2001). This is particularly important
important in situations where the posibilities for face-to-face interaction are limited, such as in
virtual organizatons. Thus, unless some degree of trust exists and where further opportunities for
social interaction are unrestricted users of such technology may be unwilling to enter in the
process of knowledge via CBIS. CBIS supported KM implementations are likely to be at their
most successful where a significant amount of common knowledge and trust already exists
between the participants sharing knowledge. This trust between individuals and the consequent
success of KM implementation is likely to be at its highest when the degree of explicitness of
the knowledge shared is relatively high. Not all of these circumstances are essential for effective
CBIS supported knowledge sharing to occur, but the more that exists at any particular period the
greater the likelihood of success. In such situations new knowledge emerges through social
interaction, rather than through any KM design led attempts to turn the tacit into the explicit
7. Conclusion
The centrality of the importance of the role computer-base information systems have in
knowledge management may be identified in much of the contemporary literature on the subject.
However, wedded as it is to a master discourse of market economics and human capital theory,
this perspective is based upon set of restricted assumptions with regard to the fundamental nature
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of knowledge, together with the assurance by promoters of KM that knowledge can be
transferred through CBIS, whilst alternative forms of knowing and learning are rendered less
visible and thus less desirable. Through analysing these assumptions the precepts of KM and the
role of CBIS within knowledge-sharing processes become more problematical.
The promotion of the potentially significant role that CBIS can play in the processes of
knowledge sharing is based upon what is referred to as an objectivist perspective on knowledge.
A central feature of the KM perspective is that there is an identifiable dichotomy between tacit
and explicit knowledge. Thus, in KM implementations tacit and explicit knowledge are identified
as two separate and distinctive types of knowledge. While the difficulty of sharing tacit knowledge through CBIS is accepted by systems developers, the sharing of explicit knowledge through
such systems is regarded as being relatively straightforward. From the `traditional’ KM
perspective certain types of knowledge are considered to be able to be expressed fully and
explicitly and are consequently able to be codified into a permanent and objective form.
Following from this assumption a model of knowledge communication is developed in which it
is suggested by KM developers that CBIS can be used for transferring explicit knowledge
between people with the full sense and meaning of it remaining intact and unmodified in the
transference process.
In contrast, the subjectivist perspective questions the possibility of the simple dichotomy
between tacit and explicit knowledge which remains the foundation of objectivist systems
design. This perspective views knowledge as possesing fundamentally different characteristics
and identifies that it contains both tacit and explicit elements which remain mutually constituted
and inseparable. Human knowledge in both its highly tacit and partially explicit form is shown to
be embodied in the socially constructed nature of the activities and actions which people
undertake and embedded in the cultural contexts and social values of those who use and develop
it. The subjectivist perspective problematises the possiblity of the successful sharing of any
knowledge even partially explicit forms via CBIS. By its very nature tacit knowledge cannot be
shared through CBIS. Without the tacit elements which underlie it partially explicit knowledge
will remain incomplete and inadequately communicated. Thus, the KM model of knowledge
sharing is undermined through the recognition that all knowledge is to some extent subjective
and can never be fully unambiguous.
A further difficulty arises in the use of language both as a means of designing and developing a
KM system and in the interaction between the system and its users once implementation has
been completed. From the subjectivist perspective knowledge communication involves active
inferrence of meaning by both those 'sending' and 'receiving' it within a particular social context
through the use of language. This critical role of the context, within which observations are made
and within which conversations take place, exposes a potential impediment to computer systems
design for knowledge management i.e. the danger of developing a system with an emphasis upon
the syntactic, at the expense of the semantic and pragmatic levels of communication. Instead, the
subjectivist perspective observes that for effective sharing of knowledge extensive and direct
social interactions between people is a prerequisite since it is only through such exchanges that
the tacit elements of knowledge may be shared.
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In conclusion although the use of computer systems within the managerial knowledge sharing
process provides access to complex communication and modelling capabilities a danger has been
identified in computer systems development based objectivist validity claims to the constituency
of knowledge which cannot be discursively questioned by the user who is not cognizant of the
system's logic. Systems which support `objective' views of organizational reality are useful, and
probably even essential, for supporting many managerial efficiency, quality and perhaps training
activities. However, in functions devoted to human knowledge formation where the concern is
mainly with the interpretation of the organizational situation, an over-use of computer systems
may marginalize more hazardous, spontaneous and intuitive forms of sense-making, leading to a
more unified `world view' but at the same time exacerbate the problems associated with
routinization. The reinforcement by the computer systems, and acceptance by the users, of a
uniform and monolithic `symbolic universe' perceived as necessary to explain and understand
what the organization is all about may disable innovative change and adaptation.
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